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This tnesis compares the processes of acquisition for ship construc-
tion projects in the Royal Australian Navy and the United States Navy.
It examines the problems associated with government furnished equipment
with regard to specifications, timing, quality assurance, and cost. The
requirements of standardisation, commonality, and interoperability with
allied nations is also discussed.
The differences are not many, and can be attributed to the demographic
aspects of each country, and the fact there is always more tnan one way
of operating. The process theoretically should flow smoothly from one
phase to the next, however, differences between authorities on minor
aspects can lead to delays in the total project.
A proposal for a replacement shipbuilding programme for the Royal
Australian Navy is presented, whereby the fleet would be continually
updated with new ships and new weapon systems on a cyclical basis. This
proposal would increase involvement by Australian industries in warships
for Australia. It would also solve many of the current problems with
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The topic for this thesis arose from the researcher's exposure to
the acquisition and contracting procedures used by the United States
Department of Defense in the procurement of goods and services for use in
the United States Navy (USN). The researcher's direct involvement with
procurement practices in the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) consisted of two
years on the staff of the Director, Naval Equipment Production from 1973
to 1975. From these experiences, it was recognised that some differences
between the acquisition policies and procedures of the Navies existed,
and that there was a possibility of each Navy learning from the other.
The RAN, the Australian Department of Defence, and the Australian
Government have recognised that problems in this area exist, and have
initiated or been involved with several recent studies in an effort to
strengthen the procurement activities. Some of the major studies are:
- Review of Project Management in the RAN, 11 July 1978, by
Captain D. J. Martin, RAN, et al
. ,
[Ref. 19];
- Joint Committee on foreign Affairs and Defence, Australian
Defence Procurement, November 1979, (Katter Committee), [Ref. 1 5 j
;
- Procurement of Equipment for New Construction Ships, March 1980,
D. F. Bruce, Chairman. (Bruce Report), [Ref. 31]; and
- Report of the Naval Procurement Working Party (NAVPRO), 28
November 1980. [Ref. 25]

These reports clearly indicate that there are several problems to be
overcome, and propose changes to the existing policies, organisations,
and procedures to strengthen tne acquisition process and to assign
responsibility and accountability to appropriate areas within the
RAN.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THIS RESEARCH
The objectives of this research are to compare the acquisition
processes of the United States Navy and the Royal Australian Navy for
ship construction projects, and to examine the problems associated with
government furnished equipment with regard to specifications, timing,
quality assurance and cost. The requirements of standardisation, com-
monality and interoperability with allied nations are also discussed.
Recommendations in these areas will be presented.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary
What are the significant differences in the ship acquisition
procedures between the RAN and the USN, and what steps are being taken,
or could be taken, to overcome major problems encountered in each of
these procedures?
2. Secondary
a. What are the problems in the ship acquisition procedures
regarding government furnished equipment (GFE)?
b. For GFE, where should the emphasis witn regard to specifica-
tion, timing, quality assurance and cost be?
10

c. What requirements exist for standardisation, commonality
and interoperability with allied nations?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS ANO ASSUMPTIONS
This research nas concentrated mainly on the project management
aspects of ship construction projects. The project or programme manager
is the driving force behind the project. To produce a viable end product,
the project manager must consider all relevant aspects put to him by
specialist groups.
In an effort to cover as many aspects as possible, detailed analysis
of any one area is limited. The arguments may therefore appear simplis-
tic in some areas, however, it is hoped that by presenting the arguments
here it will prompt deeper analyses by others in those areas of concern
or interest.
It is assumed that the reader has some basic knowledge of the require-
ments and procedures for obtaining defence-related equipment.
As Australia and the United States of America have some language
differences in the spelling and use of some words, this thesis is written
in tne "Australian" English language.
E. METHOD OF RESEARCH
The descriptions and ideas in this thesis have resulted mainly from
searching relevant literature. The literature studied included: rules,
regulations and instructions laid down oy the appropriate departments;
and reports, studies and books written on the subject of acquisition of
ships and government furnished equipment. An opportunity to visit
Seattle to talk with the ship's company of HMAS CANBERRA, the Supervisor
11

Shipbuilding Conversion and Repair, and Todd (Pacific) Shipyards, Inc.,
revealed some concerns relating to government furnished equipment for tne
Guided Missile Frigate (FFG-7) programme.
To obtain sufficient information from Australia, the assistance of a
liaison officer on the Chief of Naval Materiel' s staff was obtained.
F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
As the acquisition process in both countries involves many committees,
a list of their aooreviations, members and responsibilities is included
at Appendix A. There are no significant differences in the terminologies
used in the acquisition process, however, it is worthy to note here the
definitions of "procurement" and "acquisition."
The current definition of "procurement" used by the Australian
Joint Services is given in JSP(AS) 101 as:
"The process of obtaining personnel, services, supplies and
equipment."
The U.S. Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR) Section 1-201.13 says
that:
"Procurement includes purchasing, renting, leasing, or otherwise
obtaining supplies or services. It also includes all functions
that pertain to tne obtaining of supplies and services, including
description (but not determination) of requirements, selection
and solicitation of sources, preparation and award of contract,
and all pnases of contract administration."
The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), designed to provide uniform
regulations for all executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Govern-
ment, uses the term "acquisition" in place of "procurement," tne latter
term being synonymous with "contracting," as a subset of acquisition
functions. The definition of "acquisition" is essentially the same as
that expressed in the DAR for "procurement." The Naval Procurement
12

Working Party in Australia in their report [Ref. 25] proposed a defini-
tion for "procurement" which is almost identical to that for "acquisition"
in the FAR.
Throughout this thesis, the two terms will be used as synonyms.
G. ORGANISATION OF THIS THESIS
Any comparisons between procedures in different countries are diffi-
cult to make. There are many variables impacting on the procedures which
are unique to a particular country or organisation. Chapter II therefore
provides some background information on both countries that impacts on
the requirements and procedures for ship construction projects. Areas
considered are the basic demographic nature, the structure of the govern-
ments with their specific rules, the structure of the respective defence
departments and the organisation and size of the navies.
Chapter III begins with a description of the RAN acquisition process,
followed by a description of the process used by the USN. A comparison
of both processes is then made. By using a series of flow diagrams for
the various phases of the acquisition process, these differences, albeit
few in number, are easily seen. Areas where improvements are considered
appropriate are then suggested.
The specific problems and requirements of government furnished
equipment are described in the next chapter, Chapter IV. An attempt has
been made to highlight the areas wnere improvements would be most bene-
ficial. The areas of standardisation, commonality and interoperability
with allied nations are then discussed.
As a result of the descriptions and discussions presented in these
three chapters, a proposal for a shipbuilding programme for the Royal
13

Australian Navy is presented in Chapter V. There would be many problems
in implementing this proposal, however once the programme is running, it
should be easy to manage, it should streamline the introduction of
replacement ships into the RAN, it should involve more participation by
Australian industries, and it should improve the morale and efficiency of
those at sea and ashore wno are involved with ships. The proposal is
presented as an idea requiring further in-depth study. Individual
aspects of the proposal could be acceptable without adopting the proposal
in its entirety.
The final chapter summarises the thesis and presents the major
conclusions and recommendations emoodied in the thesis.
14

II. A LUOK AT THE COUNTRIES
A. GENERAL
This chapter will discuss the major differences between the countries
of Australia and the United States of America which impact on the require-
ments for Naval shipbuilding in each country. The areas of concern are
the physical nature of the countries, the government structure and
policies, the defence department and navy department organisations, and
the industrial base.
Australia is the smallest continent, but one of the largest nations
with an area of nearly 3 million square miles (7.75 million sq. km.).
This equates to the land area of the United States excluding Alaska and
Hawaii. The population of Australia, however, is extremely small in
proportion, being 14-1/2 million people compared to 220 million in the
USA. Both countries have abundant resources of most raw materials
including the common, precious, and exotic metals, petroleum and coal.
8. GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND POLICIES
Both Australia and the USA have a system of government based on
the idea of federalism where the powers of government are divided between
a central authority and a number of constituent territorial units. The
division of powers is laid down in the respective constitutions. The
national government has the responsibility for all matters of the national
interest. The state governments complement the activities of the national
government and provide a largely self-governing legislature to each
state. A third tier exists in the structure of both systems at the local
15

government level to administer the cities, towns, municipalities and
counties or shires.
In the USA, a presidential form of government, characterized by a
chief executive (the President) elected for a fixed term and independent
of the legislature (Congress) exists. Australia practices a parliamen-
tary system where the executive is composed of a prime minister and the
cabinet who are themselves members of the legislature (Parliament).
[Ref. 18:21-22]
Bicameral legislative branches exist in both countries, and the
chambers have the same names: the House of Representatives for the lower
houses and the Senate for the upper houses. Australia's lower house is
elected for a three year term compared to the term in the USA of two years,
The Australian Senator is elected for a six year term as is his American
counterpart. Half of the Senate is elected every three years in Australia
and a third elected every two years in the USA.
Additionally, each country has another branch to its government.
This branch is the Judiciary which is responsible for interpreting and
applying the law in those cases brought before the courts.
There are three main political parties represented in the Australian
Parliament: the Liberal Party, the Australian Labor Party, and the
National Country Party. Whilst each party represents democracy and the
rights of individuals, there are significant differences in their other
platforms. The Liberal Party encourages individual initiative and
private enterprise. The Labor Party, strongly supported by the trade
union movement, is more socialistic, believing in equality of opportunity
using federal resources. The National Country Party originated in the
16

rural sector but is also concerned with the development of manufacturing
industries. The Liberal and Country Parties usually form coalitions at
both Federal and State levels. [Ref. 2:24] The two major political
parties in the USA had opposing views in their early stages: the Demo-
crats wished to restrict the powers of the Federal Government while the
Republicans favoured a strong National Government, with aid to business
and commerce. [Ref. 18:409-414] Latterly, however, the party lines have
overlapped considerably and each no longer represents either strong
liberal or strong conservative ideals. [Ref. 13:72]
Each country has established regulations and social programmes
impacting on the procurement of goods and services for use by the govern-
ment. The USA has the Buy American Act, imposing restrictions on the
purchase of supplies of foreign origin, and the Small Business Program
favouring certain contract awards to be made to small or disadvantaged
companies. [Ref. 8:14] Australia, in recognising that Australian indus-
tries do not nave the capability to develop and produce major equipment
items needed for government procurements, nas establisned the Australian
Industry Participation (AIP) Programme, which requires overseas suppliers
to involve Australian industries in the production of tne system Deing
purchased, or a related product. The object of this programme is to
attain a greater level of self-reliance in defence supplies and to
increase the technological advancement of key industries. [Ref. 16:21]
C. ORGANISATION OF DEFENCE AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS.
1. Australia's Department of Defence
The Minister for Defence is responsible to the Parliament for
the conduct of all defence matters, including civil defence. Under
17

the Minister is the Department of Defence. Figure 1 displays the top
organisational structure of the Department. Its role is the development
of policies and advice to the Minister for Defence, a the coordination
and execution of approved policy, and the direction of the Defence Force.
At the top of the Departmental structure, jointly responsible to
the Minister is the principal civilian advisor, the Secretary, Department
of Defence, and the principal military advisor, the Chief of Defence
Force Staff (CDFS). The Chiefs of Staff of the Navy, Army and Air Force
exercise command of their respective services under the CDFS.
[Ref. 2:82]
Administration of the Defence Force is the joint responsibility
of the CDFS and the Secretary, except in relation to matters coming
within the command vested in the CDFS and the Chiefs of Staff. The
latter advise the Minister on matters relating to their professional
military responsibilities. The CDFS and the Secretary each deal with the
Government on matters of individual concern, but work together over the
range of activities which are of joint concern.
The functional organisations and divisions under the Secretary
cover the following areas: Supply and Support, Defence Science and
Technology, Manpower and Financial Services, Strategic Policy and Force
Development, and Management and Infrastructure Service. [Ref. 16:77-85]
The manpower elements are responsible for developing policies
to manage and control defence uniformed and civilian personnel. The
Secretary has statutory responsibilities to ensure regularity of expendi-



















































Australia's international defence relations and strategic policy,
analysis of force structure and associated major weapons and equipment
requirements, tne development of equipment proposals in support of
defence objectives within financial resources, come under the auspices
of the Strategic Policy and Force Development Organisation. With this
organisation are the "dual hatted" Chiefs of Materiel, with responsibil-
ity to both the Secretary and their Service Chief. They are responsible
for the development of major equipment proposals put forward by their
Service, through the various defence processes of analysis and control,
all the way to the decision point. The financial management of the Five
Year Defence Programme (FYDP) is also within this organisation.
The Management and Infrastructure Services Organisation provides
for the computing requirements of the Department. They are also respon-
sible for the formulation and implementation of defence industry, material
and procurement policies. The Defence Industry and Material Policy
(OIMP) Division has this role and, in particular, for major equipment
proposals, is responsible for the development, in close consultation with
the Service concerned and other relevant functional divisions, of acquisi-
tion strategies, management arrangements, negotiation and implementation
of Australian Industry participation proposals, and for advising on all
these aspects in the decision making process.
The Supply and Support Organisation also uses the "two natted" con-
cept. The technical and supply areas of each service are represented here
with the responsibility to the Secretary for the development and monitoring
of the defence policy and provision of technical and policy advice.
20

The Oefence Science and Technology Organisation is responsible to
tne Secretary for scientific advice in defence matters and tne analysis
of weapons systems and equipment. It maintains Australian research and
development, monitors international programmes and undertakes trials
and evaluation of proposed and existing equipment.
The Defence Organisation covers a wide scope which includes
questions of strategic and international policy, conditions of service,
procurement of sopnisticated and expensive weapon systems, and the
day-to-day management of a yery large, diverse organisation. To manage
this large organisation and to ensure all interested activities are
involved in the decision making process, the Oefence Committee system and
the FYOP are utilized. The composition and responsibilities of the
committees involved with procurement of major equipment are listed in
Appendix A. The decision making process is ultimately bound to the Five
Year Defence Programme (FYDP) system. It is the direct result of detailed
consideration concerning development of particular force capabilities for
the five years following in specific terms, and for three years following
that in general terms.
A separate department, the Department of Administrative Services
(DAS), is responsible for arranging contracts in relation to items in
common use and undertakes most categories of purchases on behalf of all
other departments, particularly the Department of Defence. DAS has three
basic involvements in the procurement procedure: the invitation of
tenders, the collation and despatch of tenders to Defence, and the issue




2. Royal Australian Navy
The Royal Australian Navy is headed by the Chief of Naval Staff,
a Vice Admiral. Under his leadership are the Fleet Commander, the Naval
Support Commander, various Area Commanders, the Naval Dockyards and the
Reserves. Additionally, Navy Office serves in a staff position.
The RAN outline organisation is depicted in Figure 2. The Navy Office
section is broken down into five functinal areas, as shown in Figure 3.
As far as procurement of major equipment is concerned, each area has some
responsibility. The Chief of Naval Operational Requirements and Plans
(CNORP) determines the operational requirements and then passes the
proposal to the Chief of Naval Materiel for eventual project direction.
The Project Director consults the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (DCNS) for
logistics, the Chief of Naval Personnel for manpower and training require-
ments, and the Chief of Naval Technical Services (CNTS) for technical
advice in the design, production and maintenance requirements.
The Royal Australian Navy has 16,500 regular personnel and 1,000
reservists. These uniformed members are supported with some 10,000
civilians employed within the Department of Defence. The naval forces
consist of one ageing aircraft carrier of a little more than 20,000 tons
(HMAS MELBOURNE), which operates Skyhawk and Tracker aircraft and Sea
King nelicopters; six conventionally powered submarines; three guided
missile destroyers and two gun destroyers; and six destroyer escorts.
[Ref. 11:87] Two FFG-7 class frigates nave recently been commissioned
and another two are being built in the USA. Additionally, a small patrol
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vessels, hydrographic and oceanographic ships and landing craft comple-
ment the "fighting ships."
The carrier, the guided missile destroyers, the existing tanker,
the submarines and one of the new patrol boats were all built outside
Australia. The last front line operational warship to be built in
Australia was a destroyer escort, HMAS TORRENS, completed in 1971. Since
that time, only one oceanographic ship, one 6,500 ton landing ship (LST)
and one patrol boat have been built in Australia. There are plans,
however, for two destroyers (probably FFG-7 type), thirteen more patrol
boats, two underway replenishment ships, a further LST, and some inshore
and seagoing mine countermeasures ships all to be built in Australia.
3. U.S. Department of Defense
The structure of the U.S. Department of Defense organisation is
far more complex than that of Australia. It is obviously a much larger
organisation, so only those participants in the weapons acquisition
business will be described here.
The Department is headed by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), a
civilian appointed by the President, who, under the President, sets
policies and directs the work of his department and the three service
departments within it. His immediate aides concerned with acquisition
are the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering), USD(R&E),
the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), USD(P), and the Assistant
Secretaries of Defense, Comptroller, ASD(C), Manpower, Reserve Affairs
and Logistics, ASD(MRA&L), and Program Analysis and Evaluation, ASD(PA&E)
The USD(R&E) is the principal advisor to the SECDEF for policies
and reviews of all research, engineering and contracting. As the current
25

Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE), he chairs the Defense System Acqui-
sition Review Council (DSARC) which in essence approves the advancement
of a major system acquisition from one phase to the next. The USD(P) is
responsible for reviews and advice on defence policies and related
operational matters.
The Comptroller does the physical preparation of the Defense
Budget and controls defence spending. He coordinates the acquisition
process with the Planning Programming and Budgeting System, (PPBS). The
ASD(MR&L) has responsibilities for logistics, energy, environmental
impact, safety and manpower planning. He ensures that the logistic
planning is consistent with the system hardware parameters, logistic
policies and readiness objectives. The ASD (PA&E) is responsible for the
evaluation of the individual weapons systems programmes, both from a
standpoint of individual cost effectiveness and from an integrated force
structure viewpoint. [Ref. 9]
All of the above officials are members of the DSARC, as is the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who has the responsibility of
reviewing force levels, strategy and tactical implications. The DSARC
has advisory members drawn from other areas within the Secretary of
Defense organisation.
The Department of Defense is regulated in its procurement activ-
ities by the Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR), and claims against the
government by civilian contractors are reviewed by the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA). Two other agencies of significance
to systems acquisition report to the OSD. The Defense Contract Audit
Agency (DCAA) performs all necessary contract audits for DoD. They also
26

provide accounting and financial advisory services regarding contracts
and subcontracts to all components of DoO who are responsible for
procurement and contract administration. The Defense Contract Administra-
tion Service Office (DCASO) seldom becomes involved in the administration
of a prime contract for a ship, but has a responsibility for contract
administration for weapons procurement, the major portion of government
furnished equipment (GFE). [Ref. 17:96-101]
Figure 4 shows the organisation of the U.S. Department of Defense
as it relates to acquisition.
4. The United States Navy
The Department of Navy can logically be divided in two areas.
The Secretary of the Navy is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for
the activities of both the Office of the Secretary of the Navy and the
Chief of Naval Operations. [Ref. 17:101] Figure 5 is a diagram of the
formal organisation of the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, and of
the Chief of Naval Operations.
a. Office of the Secretary of the Navy
This office is similar in structure to that of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD), with the deletion of the Program Analysis
and Evaluation Division. This activity is performed in the Systems
Analysis section under the Chief of Naval Operations.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Engineering
and Systems), ASN(RE&S), is responsible for all matters related to RDT&E
within the Navy. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Comptroller),
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Affairs and Logistics), ASN(MRA&L), have equivalent responsibilities to
their counterparts ADS(C) and ADS(MRA&L).
As in OSD, a Service System Acquisition Review Council
exists, DNSARC for the Navy, performing the same functions for the
Secretary of the Navy as the DSARC does for the Secretary of Defense.
DNSARC would review all naval acquisitions and make recommendations for
major equipment to the DSARC.
b. Chief of Naval Operations
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) commands the operating
forces of the Navy which includes several fleets, seagoing forces and the
Marine Forces. He also commands the Naval Material Command, and the
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
Within the organisation of the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations (OPNAV) are many areas with responsibilities for major system
procurement. The operational requirements are provided by the line
organisations including Manpower, Submarine Warfare, Surface Warfare,
Logistics, Air Warfare and Plans, Policy and Operations. Their respon-
sibilities include not only the material requirements, but also the
operational readiness, tactical doctrine, training and related require-
ments. The Staff functions performed by such divisions as Program
Planning, Intelligence, ASW and Ocean Surveillance, and RDT&E, provide
basic coordination across all programmes and offices. [Ref. 30:
Appendix E]
The Naval Material Command (NAVMAT) commanded by the Chief
of Naval Material (CNM) is the single integrated material support agency
responsible for the total weapons support systems development, procurement,
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production and support, including human operator integration, depot
maintenance, supply management, facility support and integrated logistic
support planning. The organisation is divided into several systems
commands responsible respectively for Air, Electronic, Facilities Engin-
eering, Sea, and Supply. These systems commands are the providers of the
weapon systems and support to the operating units of the Navy. Project
Officers are established by CNM to accomplish specific tasks.
[Ref. 17: 108]
In turn, the systems commands are divided further into areas
dealing with planning, acquisitions, RDT&E and support.
The USN itself comprises more than 520,000 uniformed person-
nel with many civilians also employed. The size of the USN is wery
large, consisting of over 400 ships, the breakdown of which is too
involved for this research.
An on-going shipbuilding programme does exist that has
generated over 400 ships excluding patrol, landing, mine and service
craft, during the last twenty years. Roughly 90 percent of these have
been built in commercial shipyards, the remaining 10 percent in Naval
shipyards; however, none have been ordered since 1967 from the latter.
The number of destroyers and frigates built in this time frame is nearing
150. [Ref. 26: Chapter 1]
D. INDUSTRIAL BASE AND CAPABILITIES
The industrial base required to support the needs of a defence
force could be considered as a hierarchy like that depicted in Figure 6.
In Australia, the dependence is centered mainly in the upper echelons
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America, the majority of defence equipment is supplied by dedicated
defence industries. There is a growing technological gap between the
commercial industry requirements and the demanding technologies of
advanced defence systems, making the dedicated industries necessary, but
such firms can only continue if there is sufficient stability in
requirements.
To describe and comment on the complete industrial base and capabil-
ities of each country would require extensive research outside the scope
of this thesis. However, it is worth highlighting some of the aspects of
each country's industries that are related to the production of a warship,
1. Austral ia
Australia has a broad industrial base capable of producing a
wide variety of manufactures. Tariff protection and quota restrictions
on imported goods that have allowed the manufacturing industries to grow
substantially in this area now account for about 25 percent of the gross
domestic product. Essential technologies have not only been "imported"
under licence from overseas industries, but have also been the result of
much domestic innovation, resulting in overseas licencing of Australian-
divised products and processes. [Ref. 2: 67]
Australian shipyards are of three types: Government owned and
operated, Government owned/contractor operated, and contractor owned and
operated. In the past, warships of destroyer and frigate size have been
built in the former two types of dockyards. Patrol ooats, and recently,
amphibious heavy lift ships of 6,000 tonnes have been built in commercial
yards. Commercial yards have the capacity to construct merchant ships up
to 80,000 tonnes. A government bounty of 25 percent is provided on
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commercial ships built in registered Australian yards for use in Aus-
tralian waters or internationally under the Australian Flag. The largest
naval vessel so far built in Australia is HMAS STALWART, a destroyer
maintenance vessel of about 16,000 tonnes. Under construction at this
time is a Fleet Underway Replenishment Ship of about 18,000 tonnes.
The Australian electrical industry produces a wide range of
electrical motors, switch gear, control gear, and wires and cables. The
electronics industry produces telecommunications equipment and is capable
of producing complicated defence electronic requirements, such as the
Mulloka Sonar and Barra Sonobuoys. Most of the electronics industries
are Australian subsidiaries of big foreign companies, the notable excep-
tion being the Australian-owned Amalgamated Wireless (Australasia)
Limited. [Ref. 2: 69]
The engineering industries produce a wide range of hand and
machine tools, metalworking machinery, and materials handling equipment.
Roller bearings, die casting, petrol engines, valves and control equip-
ment, pumping and ventilating equipment are the products of the light
engineering industries. Heavy engineering industries have produced
railway rolling stock, diesel -electric locomotives, commercial motor
vehicles, earth-moving, excavating and agricultural equipment and
tractors. [Ref. 2: 69]
This brief account of the type of products capable of being
produced in Australia shows that Australian industries are able to
tender for many military items within reach of their technologies.
However, the ability and willingness of firms to bid for the more tech-
nologically demanding defence equipments have been limited by the small
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numbers required of each item, the high cost of developing a comprehen-
sive tender response, and the need to establish specialised techniques
and facilities. [Ref. 10: 38]
2. United States of America
America has an even broader industrial base than Australia.
Because of the volume of defence requirements, there are many firms which
are totally defence-related, with little or no application to commercial
products. Such companies exist mainly to take advantage of the rapidly
changing technology which has benefits in that the members of the company
gain valuable training in the technical skills and that defence work has
a favorable influence on investment analysis by some segments of the
American public. [Ref. 12: 53]
There are over four hundred yards engaged in shipbuilding and
repair in the United States; however, there are only twenty-six performing
a significant amount of new ship construction. The U.S. Navy accounts
for seventy-five percent of the new construction and this is undertaken
in eleven privately owned yards, belonging to nine companies. Three of
these yards are capable of, but only two currently engaged in, nuclear
ship new construction. [Ref. 14: 516-527 and 26: Chapter 1]
United States shipbuilders, as Australian shipbuilders, are
not competitive on the world market for commercial ships. Civil ship
construction is subsidised up to 35% of total costs. [Ref. 14: 515]
The defence industry is characterised by a number of large
conglomerates each with divisions covering the sectors of aircraft,
ships, electronics and vehicles, however, there is a considerable overlap
in the production and engineering skills required, as well as the
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production equipment and facilities utilized. These industries are
capable of producing any equipments needed to meet a perceived threat,
but equally important is their ability to conduct much research and
development to advance technologically.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter has identified some major aspects of both Australia
and the United States of America which impact on the ship construction
projects required to maintain the ability and advancement of the respec-
tive navies. The most obvious difference is the difference in the sizes
of the populations resulting in less money available for defence spending




III. SHIP ACQUISITION PROCEDURES
A. GENERAL
This chapter will describe the acquisition procedures of both navies
followed by a comparative section which will also suggest some possible
problems and solutions to the procedures. It will be shown that the
differences in the procedures are not particularly significant.
There have been many books written and studies undertaken about
acquisition in the USA. It has not been possible in this research effort
to cover each one, but it appears that the majority of these studies are
directed at the physical process and not at the individual participants
in the process. It will be demonstrated that the procedures are in the
main quite streamlined, with some feedback loops for necessary amendments.
However, the full internal passages of major equipment proposals within
the navies are not discussed in detail here, and these areas could be the
root of some of the current problems.
B. THE RAN SHIP ACQUISITION PROCEDURES.
1. Introduction
The ship acquisition process used in the Royal Australian Navy
follows the procedures for Major Equipment Proposals. A major equipment is
one which conforms to any one of the following criteria: [Ref . 1: Art 0214]
- has significant Defence policy implications;
- has significant Joint Service implications;
- is estimated to have a project investment cost (all onetime
costs including research and development, prime equipment,
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spares, modifications, training investment, facilities machin-
ery and plant, test equipment and supporting equipment) of
$10 million or more; or
- where the unit cost of individual equipment is estimated
at $0.5 M or more (excluding spares, documentation, support,
etc.).
This section will describe the procurement process, a simplified
form of which is depicted in Figure 7. This process may be divided,
somewhat arbitrarily, into four distinct stages, namely:
- the identification and specification of a general requirement
for a force capability;
- the examination and analysis which lead to the seeking of
a generic approval from the Government to acquire a specific
capability;
- the selection of the equipment to be purchased; and
- the production and entry of the equipment into service.
These stages are shown in Figure 8.
The first two stages are sequential and cyclical and relate to
the development and examination of major equipment proposals, and com-
prise an integral part of the Five Year Defence Programme (FYDP). The
latter two stages are in general related to the particular Service only
and thus become less dependent on the cyclical reviews of the FYDP, but
still require appropriate Governmental approval at significant milestones,
The descriptions in this section have been developed from the
appropriate Defence Instructions (General) [Ref. 4, 5, 6, and 7], and the
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a. Identifying and Specifying a Requirement
The requirement for new equipment may originate from one
of three ways: as a result of a new threat, new technology, or as a
result of existing equipment becoming obsolescent.
Changes in Australia's strategic circumstances would consti-
tute a new need. Strategic and other basic guidance (such as environmen-
tal or technical factors) are issued from time-to-time by the Defence
Committee for defence planning and programming. Then the "Defence Force
Capabilities" document is prepared by the Defence Force Development
Committee (DFDC). This is a policy document which identifies the present
military and other defence capabilities, their limitations and the extent
to which capabilities should be developed or varied. This paper is not
written in terms of specific equipments, but indicates the areas in which
adjustments to existing capabilities are required.
The Services then formulate five-year programmes to initiate
projects to affect the necessary adjustments to the force structure.
Where this involves the need for new or updated equipment, the Services
initiate proposals for their acquisition in the form of Staff Objectives,
Staff Targets, or Staff Requirements.
The Staff Objective is a statement of a capability considered
to be necessary for the effective conduct of operations. It specifies
the relevance, importance and timing of the requirement and identifies
potential options for meeting the requirement. A preliminary study is
then conducted by the Service and the Defence Operational Requirements
Committee (DORC) to confirm the need and to show that the concept is
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practicable, and can be met technologically. Where this is done, the
Service may proceed to a Staff Requirement. If there is any doubt,
however, a Staff Target will be raised instead.
The Staff Target describes in broad terms the functions and
desired performance of an equipment as a basis for determining the
technical and scientific feasibility of the proposal, the risks involved
and the indicative costs. The Naval Staff Target is first considered by
the Naval Staff Requirements Committee (NSRC) and if approved is passed
on to the DORC for endorsement.
The Staff Requirement is a statement of the function, main
features and performance required of an equipment which can reasonably
be expected to be available in the stated time frame to enable proposal
requirement definition and approval for the acquisition to proceed.
Staff Requirements are subjected to intensive intra-service evaluation
before being submitted to the DORC for review and endorsement. The Staff
Requirement is continually updated during the procurement process and can
be used in the final source selection. A "sanitised" version may also be
released to industry when assistance in the development of a future
project may be required.
b. Seeking Generic Approval
With the Defence Operational Requirements Committee's endorse-
ment of the Staff Requirement, the Service proceeds to issue the "Major
Equipment Submission - Form DPI." The DPI represents a detailed examina-




- justification and objective;
- assumptions;




- force structure implications;
- compatibility of equipment;
- production aspects;





- cost implications; and
- implementation programme.
The DPI is submitted to the Force Development and Analysis Division
(FDA) which, in conjunction with the relevant Service office, develops
the Project Brief. This brief sets out the major points concerning the
proposal together with an objective analysis of options and alternative
views. Particularly significant or complex proposals are handled by a
special group composed of all interested Services or Divisions, to ensure
that all the aspects of the proposal are analysed.
The Major Equipment Proposals are then examined by the
Force Structure Committee (FSC) in two separate review periods in each
financial year. In the initial review (September to December), the
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acceptability of each proposal is examined for its further consideration
in the FYDP. Those proposals examined previously are reviewed for
adequacy of development and continued relevance. The FSC consideration
includes such items as: financial guidelines from the Government, the
level of annual commitments in the FYDP, major equipment proposals likely
to arise in the years beyond the FYDP, and general views held by the FSC
and Defence Forces Development Committee (DFDC).
A consolidation of all equipment proposals, whether new or
approved, both major and minor, manpower costs, defence facilities,
operating costs, etc., is then prepared for consideration by the DFDC.
Those proposals with final approval of the DFDC are submitted to the
Minister of Defence for approval by the Cabinet in the context of the
annual Budget. Depending upon the stage a project has reached, this
approval will take one of the following forms:
- project approval -- approval of the generic type of
equipment;
- project development -- approval to continue to develop
and refine a project;
- project definition -- approval to enter into activities
likely to involve outside agencies to more precisely
define the scope and implications of the project; and
- evaluation — approval for evaluation of contending
equipments for a particular project.
These approvals do not constitute approval to expend funds, except
where the Minister or his delegates may approve expenditure within
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budgetary provisions and defined limits. Once Cabinet endorses Year One
proposals further project development then proceeds towards procurement,
c. Selecting the Equipment to be Purchased
As a project moves through the FYDP from Year five to the year
of decision, details of costing and the Required Major Characteristics
are continuously reviewed and refined. For multiphased projects, such as
ship construction, the design and production phases are separated and the
approval for the first phase only will be given. At this time, a deci-
sion to design and produce in Australia or to purchase overseas may not
have been finalised. This decision will depend primarily on the char-
acteristics required. If the procurement is from overseas, this phase
entails a project definition task; but if the design and production is to
be undertaken in Australia, this phase is for the preliminary design
only.
With such documents as the Major Characteristic and the
sanitised Staff Requirement released to industry, commercial firms may
now respond to an Invitation to Register Interest. If the tender is to
be restricted to certain firms only, a Certificate of Inexpediency is
required by Treasury regulations, and obtained by applying to the Depart-
ment of Administrative Services (DAS).
Firms responding to the above are evaluated by DAS, Navy
and Defence and a short list of firms is prepared who will now be issued
a tender package for phase one and an invitation to tender.
The Navy's contribution to the tender package is usually
the technical specification with any other additional or special require-
ments such as training or handbooks, etc., which are to be included in
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the prime contract, and any particular contractual requirements such as
delivery, testing, quality assurance and warranties. The tender responses
are evaluated and as a result contract is, or sometimes more than one
contracts are, awarded for the Preliminary Design Definition phase.
Although competition is encouraged, the cost of several contracts is
often prohibitive, and it is therefore most important that a detailed and
firm cost estimate for following phases is available before this contract
is awarded.
As an alternative to the Preliminary Design being obtained
from commercial firms, an In-house Design may be developed.
From the Preliminary Design, if required, a further phase is
used for a Final Design and preparation of a tender package for
production.
d. Production
With the final design selected, approval is now sought
to proceed further into final negotiations and placing of the order.
It may have been necessary for other procurements forming
part of the overall ship procurement to be ordered before the contract
for ship construction is awarded. These long lead items, as well as
other acquisitions impacting in the project, form what is known as
Australian Goverment Furnished Equipment (AGFE).
The construction of the ship is closely monitored and when
completed is subjected to many trials, both by the shipbuilder and the




3. Managing the Process for Ship Projects
a. Developing the Five Year Defence Programme
The Five Year Defence Programme (FYDP) is formulated each
year based on bids submitted by the Defence Organisations in support of
endorsed policy objectives for ongoing activities and new capital equip-
ment and facilities proposals. New or replacement ship proposals are
considered as new capital equipment proposals.
Although the FYDP is prepared each year, it is in effect an
updated version of the previous year's FYDP with necessary modifications
for new requirements and revised priorities.
b. Organisation of Ship Acquisition
The Director General of Naval Operational Requirements
(DGNOR) is responsible for the sponsorship of ship projects and the
preparation of the Draft Naval Staff Requirement and Required Major
Characteristics. For ship projects, a Project Director is normally
appointed on approval of the Naval Staff Objective (NSO), the Naval Staff
Target (NST) or the Naval Staff Requirement (NSR).
The Project Director is responsible to the Chief of Naval
Materiel (CNM), who assumes overall management of the project from the
date of approval of the NSR, or in the case of an NST, at the commencement
of the feasibility study. Initially, the Project Director will be
required to develop the appropriate documentation and be involved
in project related activities. As the acquisition process proceeds, he
becomes responsible for:
- planning and coordination of all project activities;
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- placing agreed tasks with the functional areas for
execution;
- maintaining a comprehensive review of physical and finan-
cial progress against planned targets; and
- taking or recommending action to correct any deviation.
The size of the Project Office will vary, depending upon
several factors, from a part-time Project Director to a fully dedicated
Project Office. No two projects are exactly the same and so the composi-
tion of the Project Office is regulated by the timing, complexity and
workload, priority, cost and availability of manpower.
A matrix Project Management system is usually employed in
the RAN, to make the most effective use of manpower resources and the
benefits of functional experience. The functional areas provide the
appropriate involvement in the Project. The level of effort required of
each functional area is spelled out in the Project Management and Acqui-
sition Plan.
c. Project Management Documentation
Two major planning documents are used to cover the entire
period of a major project, from the formulative stages to the entry of the
equipment into service: the Equipment Acquisition Strategy (EAS) and the
Project Management and Acquisition Plan (PMAP).
(1) Equipment Acquisition Strategy (EAS) . The EAS defines
the parameters and provides the framework within which all participants
in the acquisition of major equipment are to work. It establishes the
nature and sequence of activities, outlines the strategy to be used and
the time frame in which the procurement is to be conducted. The EAS for
48

each specific equipment acquisition is currently prepared by the Defence
Industry and Material Policy Division (DIMP) but there are indications
that this will become the responsibility of the Chief of Naval Materiel
(CNM) in conjunction with DIMP. It is usually developed after the Staff
Requirement has been endorsed by the DORC.
The events and activities identified and the matters
normally addressed in the EAS are:
- preparation of and release dates to industry for
the Naval Staff Target/Requirement and associated
documents including Request for Proposals;
- early development of comprehensive capability
specifications for both prime and support equipment;
- estabalishment of maintenance support and training
requirements;
- development of related requirements and offset
programmes for Australian Industry;
- preparation of tender schedules for the conduct
of feasibility studies, project development, contract
definition exercises and equipment acquisition
with prospective suppliers; and
- tactics to be employed and the methods to be used
for maintaining competition whilst progressively
reducing the number of prospective brands of equipment
to a short list of at least two, for which final
negotiations are to be conducted.
49

Whilst this list is by no means exhaustive, it does show
that the EAS is a major tool in the development and management of a
project. It is a dynamic document which is up-dated throughout the life
of a project. It provides a focus for achieving the best overall result
in terms of operational performance, cost, delivery, time scale, product
support and involvement of Australian Industry. It is tailored to
optimize the results obtainable from competative situations, sole source
and Government-to-Government procurements, for example, Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) procedures with the U.S. Government.
(2) The Project Management and Acquisition Plan (PMAP) . The
Project Director, on approval of the EAS, prepares the more detailed
and comprehensive Project Management and Acquisition Plan (PMAP). It
identifies and documents in quite specific detail a number of aspects
of the project, with emphasis on the contract implementation and sur-
veillance stages of the project. Such aspects are:
- statements of internal departmental management
arrangements and the allocation of the responsibility,
authority and accountability for the achievement of
allocated project tasks;
- a complete listing of tasks required to bring the
equipment into full operational service;
- statements covering all aspects of Australian
Industry Participation;




- funding and expenditure plans for all aspects
of the project;
- major milestones and review points; and
- administrative and reporting procedures of the
day-to-day control of the project.
As with the EAS, certain aspects of the PMAP may not
be specified and documented completely at first, but only as the
project develops. It is important, however, to establish at the outset
the particular tasks and management arrangements and appropriate
responsibilities.
The EAS and PMAP are planning documents incorporated
into an executive document, the Naval Project Directive (NPD) which gives
instruction and direction to implement the project.
4. Summary
This section has described the procedures in the Royal Australian
Navy for the acquisition of major new equipments. Ships are considered
major new equipments, but obviously form very complicated projects. The
procedures are laid down in Defence Instruction (General) ADMIN 05-1,
05-2, 05-3, and 05-4, supplemented by ABR 5069, RAN Project Management
Manual. The procedures emphasise the need for approval at various stages
of a project and identify the necessary approval processes.
c. THE USN SHIP ACQUISITION PROCESS
1. Introduction
The U.S. Department of Defense has defined a major system as one
where: [Ref. 28 and 29]
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- there is a development risk, urgency of need, or is of interest
to the Secretary of Defense;
- there is a requirement for joint acquisition between Department
of Defense components, or between nations;
- the anticipated cost of research, development, test and
evaluation, (RDT&E) exceeds $100 million; or the production
costs are expected to exceed $500 million; and
- there are particular circumstances related to the manpower
requirements, follow on support, or Congressional interest.
The acquisition process for such systems is based on the require-
ments of 0MB Circular A-109, which DoD has implemented via directives
5000.1 and 5000.2. The principal change from previous directives is
the addition of "milestone zero" as a Secretary of Defense decision to
initiate a program, in conformance with 0MB circular A-109.
This section will describe the acquisition process, a simplified
form of which is depicted in Figure 9. This process may be divided into
five distinct stages, namely:
- determination of mission needs;
- alternative concept exploration;
- demonstration and validation;
- full scale engineering developments; and
- production and use of the system.
After the description of the process, an organisational view is
presented to show how the process is managed, and some of the documenta-
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Much of the descriptions that follow have been developed using
0MB Circular A-109, [Ref. 23] the Naval Ship Procurement Process Study,
[Ref. 26] the Ship Acquisition Reef Points, [Ref. 22] and relevant
Defense Instructions. [Ref. 28 and 29]
2. The Process
a. Determination of Mission Needs
The initial step in determining the needs of a new major
equipment is the consideration of national objectives and policies, with
due cognizance of the economic conditions, social attitudes and available
technology. [(Ref. 22] The National Security Council (NSC) is respon-
sible for developing the national security policy which is published in
the Presidential Review Memoranda (PRM). On approval by the President,
those documents become Presidential Decision Memoranda (PDM), which, with
intelligence estimates provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
are used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to formulate strategies, both
short term (up to 10 years) and long term (up to 20 years). The U.S.
Navy uses these studies to develop the roles and contributions required of
the Navy for the national defense.
Where the existing or projected capability of the Navy is
deficient in meeting the strategic guidelines, needs are established for
new systems to meet the mission requirements. The Navy proposes the
"Mission Element Need Statement" (MENS) to recommend the initiation of a
new major system acquisition programme.
This document is submitted for review by the Defense Acquisi-
tion Executive (DAE), and the Offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Secretary of Defense (OJCS and OSD). After this review,
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recommendations are made to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) for approval
of the MENS. This approval, the Secretary of Defense Decision Memorandum
(SDDM), is the Milestone Zero decision point, and allows the Navy to
proceed into the next phase, Concept Exploration,
b. Concept Exploration
Following approval of the MENS and authorisation to proceed,
the acquisition cycle moves into the Concept Exploration phase, which
includes the solicitation, evaluation and competitive exploration of
alternative system concepts. The Program Manager is appointed at the
start of this phase.
The first step in this phase is an in-depth expansion of the
mission feasibility studies, that may have been initiated prior to
milestone zero, to establish and define criteria for synthesising alter-
native system concepts.
The second step is the commencement of preliminary studies
exploring the alternative systems concepts. This is the responsibility
of the Navy and includes the investigation of the system cost and effec-
tiveness of the alternative candidate approaches. The solicitation for
proposed solutions is in terms of mission needs and not explicit system
characteristics, and provides complete information including the mission
task, the operating environment, and the threat. Each approach is
analysed, evaluated and optimised in order to present the recommended
alternatives or alternative for the Milestone 1 decision at the end of
this phase. Adequate competition is desirable to avoid premature commit-
ments to solutions that may prove costly or are marginally effective.
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The third and last step in this phase is the development of
the Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP) and the Integrated Program Summary
(IPS), which detail the recommended approach with respect to cost,
schedule and technical risk. These documents are forwarded through the
Department of the Navy Systems Acquisition Review Council (DNSARC) to the
Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) for review. Appropri-
ate recommendations are then made to SECDEF for approval.
Approval of the programme by SECDEF, via the SDDM, at Mile-
stone 1 allows the acquisition process to continue into the Demonstration
and Validation Phase.
c. Demonstration and Validation
During the Demonstration and Validation Phase, the selected
alternatives are refined through extensive study and analysis. Advanced
development models (prototypes) are developed to meet the operational
requirements. The prototypes are tested and evaluated, usually by the
contractor and the Navy, to assess the performance and availability of
the high risk parts of the system and to reduce the development risk.
Competition is actively encouraged and prototypes may be
developed simultaneously by two or more contractors. These prototypes
and other experimental models are used to demonstrate that the required
performance capability can be achieved, while reducing the technical
uncertainty. Prototypes for ships are not required. The DCP and IPS are
again prepared for review by the DSARC at Milestone 2, and subsequent




d. Full Scale Development
The Full Scale Development Phase includes refining the
prototype for production and may also include a limited production run
for operational test and evaluation.
The main activities conducted during this phase are as
follows:
- the threat and need assessment are re-evaluated and
updated;
- the systems or equipments and other principle items for
production and future support are designed, fabricated,
tested and evaluated;
- preproduction prototypes are fabricated with the documen-
tation necessary to enter the following phase of full
scale production;
- development and operational test and evaluation of the
preproduction prototypes are performed to determine
whether the product meets its specifications and what
changes would be required for the production phase;
- long lead items are finalised and orders placed if
necessary to meet the production schedule; and
- the detailed concepts and methods of operations, main-
tenance, training, facilities, logistics, publications,
manpower and support equipment are refined and documented.
At the end of this phase (Milestone 3), the DCP and IPS are
again updated and submitted to DSARC. The DSARC III reviews and recommends
approval of the system, determining whether or not to proceed into the
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last phase of the acquisition process of a major system, the Production
and Deployment Phase.
e. Production and Deployment
The Production and Deployment Phase can logically be split
into two separate activities, with an overlapping of each. The Produc-
tion activity starts with the approval to proceed at Milestone 3 and
continues until the last system is delivered and accepted. The Deployment
activity begins with the acceptance of the first operational system and
continues until the system is phased out of the inventory.
3. Managing the Process for Ship Projects
a. Developing the Five-Year Shipbuilding Plan
The U.S. Navy shipbuilding programme is extremely complex
resulting in the acquisition of a wide variety of ships ranging from huge
nuclear aircraft carriers and complex submarines to small auxiliary and
patrol craft, [Ref. 26: 3]. The building block for this programme is the
Five-Year Shipbuilding Plan, the Navy's request to Congress (as approved
by SECDEF and the President) for the ships believed necessary to accom-
plish assigned missions. This five year programme is up-dated annually
as part of the budget submission by the President. It includes a break-
down of the number of ships by type and a cost estimate for the total
package including all government furnished equipment (GFE). The ship-
building plan is developed by consideration of the size and mix of the
ships deemed necessary, the funding requirements and the ability of the
shipbuilding industry to meet the programme.
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b. Organisation for Ship Acquisition
The actual acquisition begins on approval by the Congress of
the Five-Year Shipbuilding Program. Several Navy organisations become
involved, but the major responsibility is assigned to the Naval Sea
Systems Command (NAVSEA). A Ship Acquisition Project Manager (SHAPM) is
assigned at Milestone 0, and has the responsibility for providing fleet-
worthy ships to the operating forces or designated recipients, fully
supported and according to the requirements and schedules as expressed by
the Chief of Naval Operations. [Ref. 22: 90] A project office is set
up, the structure and composition of which is dependent on the particular
project. NAVSEA usually employs a small workforce coordinating and
managing the efforts of larger functional organisations that affect the
project.
Such functions as risk analysis, configuration management,
integrated logistic support (ILS), plans and change management are
the responsibility of the SHAPM. The SHAPM, through a system of Ship
Project Directives (SPDs), directs and controls the actions of various
functional organisations in providing necessary inputs to the project. A
major area in this regard is the provisioning of Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE) and Government Furnished Information (GFI). A warship is
an integration of many systems, some of which are developed concurrently
with the ship design. Thus, there is a need for the project managers for
these component systems to continuously keep the SHAPM informed on
aspects that will affect this programme. SPDs form a "contractual"
document between the SHAPMs and the participating managers (PARMs).
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All contracts negotiated and awarded for the shipbuilding
project are handled by a Procurement Contracting Officer (PCO). The PCO
is normally organisationally apart from the SHAPM, but he retains contract
autonomy, while the SHAPM controls the funding. The administration of
the contracts is the responsibility of the Supervisor of Shipbuilding
(SUPSHIPS).
c. Project Management Documentation
The most important project documentation prepared by the
SHAPM is the Ship Acquisition Plan (SHAP) Outline. This document reflects
all the data on the project known to date and lays down the dates for all
SPDs to be issued to support the project. As the program proceeds, the
outline is refined continuously and the SHAP itself is developed which
details the plan and strategy to be followed throughout the acquisition
process. It reflects the management concept for directing and control-
ing all the elements of the acquisition to meet the goals and objectives
of the programme. The strategy is developed during the Concept Develop-
ment Phase and covers such areas as competitive procurement, during this
phase and future phases. This document evolves through an iterative
process and becomes increasingly definitive as the programme advances.
It is not a document requiring approval by any other authority, but it
forms the basis of other documents such as the DCP/IPS.
Other documents of note are the Top Level Requirement (TLR)
and the Top Level Specification (TLS). The former defines the opera-
tional requirements of the ship to be produced, stipulates the maximum
cost and identifies all other constraints affecting the project. The
TLS translates the TLR into a description of the ship and provides
60

a bridge between the TLR and the contract specifications that will be
developed for the procurement of the ship.
4. Summary
This section has described the U.S. Navy procedures to be fol-
lowed for the acquisition of major systems. These procedures are based
on the requirements of 0MB Circular A-109, which have been incorporated
into DODD 5000.1 and DODI 5000.2 to reflect the specific needs and policies
of the Department of Defense. The directives emphasise the establishment
of a project office and the concept of decision milestone points during
the process of the acquisition. The project manager is appointed early
in the process and he develops certain documents enabling him to control,
direct and monitor the progress of acquisition.
D. COMPARING THE RAN AND USN PROCEDURES
This section will compare and comment on the procedures of the
RAN and USN Ship Acquisition Procedures. Figures 10a through lOd show a
side by side pictorial presentation of both countries' procedures for
each major phase of the process. These figures do not show the internal
endorsement and approval processes by the respective navies necessary
before consideration by the respective defence departments.
An examination of the flow diagrams shows that the procedures have
sequential steps with sufficient feedback loops for the re-examination of
the requirements where necessary. It is considered that the procedures
as they stand are satisfactory.
The topics addressed in the documents forwarded to the decision
makers in both countries are also comparable. The prime document in
the RAN is the Major Equipment Submission -- Form DPI; the prime documents
61
































Figure 10a. IDENTIFYING NEEDS
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TO PROJECT DEVELOPMENT TO DEMONSTRATION & VALIDATION
Figure 10b. GENERIC APPROVAL/CONCEPT EXPLORATION
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TO FULL SCALE DEVELOPMENT
Figure IOC. PROJECT DEVELOPMENT/DEMONSTRATION AND VALIDATION
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TO PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT
Figure lOd. PROJECT DEFINITION/FULL SCALE DEVELOPMENT
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in the USN being the Decision coordinating Paper (DCP) and Integrated
Program Summary (IPS).
There is, however, a general feeling, evident by the many studies
and papers written, that there are problems with the procurement process.
If it is accepted that the procedural steps in figure 10 are satisfactory
and flow logically from one endorsement or approval to another, the
problems must be within the organisations involved in the process.
For the RAN, the Bruce Working Party reported that many delays were
occurring due to the organisation of Naval procurement which was not
sufficiently unified. Consequently, the responsibility and accountabil-
ity for procurement actions were ill -defined, and communication between
branches difficult. [Ref. 31: paragraphs 73-77] The Working Party
proposed an outline structure for a Naval Procurement Division within
which would be commodity procurement cells, a major project cell and
control cells for financial and management systems. In the USN, these
functions are all within the Naval Material Command, and even appear in
the individual systems commands. The proposed structure, under the
leadership of the Chief of Naval Procurement, would significantly reduce
the continual debate of contentious points of a proposal between numerous
directorates when these contentious points do not significantly alter the
total content of the proposal. Dedicated procurement officers would gain
experience in this field, which currently is staffed by many non-
specialists. The NAVPRO Working Party examined the Bruce proposal in
greater depth and proposed three options for the reorganisation of the
present technical and materiel divisions to improve the project
administration and project activities. [Ref. 25: Chapter 7]
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An opinion as to which option would be most appropriate is outside
the capabilities of this author. However, it is felt that although there
is a need to have the responsibility and accountability delegated to the
lowest level possible, the organisation within the RAN should be con-
sidered in the light of the other Australian services and the Department
of Defence as a whole.
Common organisational structures and procedures within all defence
factions would enable conformity in approach, considered necessary for a
country like Australia. The training of procurement personnel and their
subsequent experience along common lines would strengthen the expertise
in the acquisition of defence equipments. Australian industries would
find it easier in their dealings with the Services and the Defence
Department.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter has described the processes used in the procurement of
major systems by both the RAN and the USN. A comparison has shown that
the procedures are almost identical.
However, there is evidence that there are several problems which
cause delays in the processes, and it is considered that these problems
lie not in the procedures, but the management of the procedures within
the navies. A unified Naval Procurement Directorate has been proposed
for the RAN by the Bruce and Naval Procurement Working Parties. Further
study into this area is recommended, however, for a small country such as
Australia; each of the Services and the Defence Department should be
organised along similar lines for procurement activities.
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IV. GFE AND STANDARDISATION CONSIDERATIONS
A. GENERAL
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) is that equipment supplied to
a contractor for subsequent use in the manufacturing of, or incorporating
in, the item being procured. The technical information describing such
equipment or information provided in suport of the production, such as
specifications and standards, is called Government Furnished Information
(GFI). Collectively, the above items are known as Government Furnished
Materials (GFM). Items procured by the contractor for use in production
are known as Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE).
The U.S. Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR), suggest that the use
of Government Furnished Equipment be restricted. DAR 13-201 says:
"It is the general policy of the Department of Defense that Con-
tractors will furnish all material required for the performance of
government contracts. However, the Government should furnish
material to a contractor when it is determined to be in the best
interest of the government by reason of economy, standardization,
the expediting of production, or other appropriate circumstances."
This researcher knows of no equivalent Australian policy statement.
Items of equipment are generally designated as GFM for ship construc-
tion projects when it is considered to be in the best interest of the
government to do so. This usually occurs under one or more of the
following conditions: [Ref. 24: 7]
- the production lead time of the equipment is so lengthy that
the procurement action for it must commence before the shipbuild-
ing contract is let;
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- the material to be supplied is still in the development stage
and will be produced concurrently with the shipbuilding programme,
and hence definitive specifications cannot be provided and the
large attendent element of risk would be inappropriate for the
shipbuilder to bear;
- a requirement exists to standardise with other equipments already
in service, or already being procured under other contracts, and
cost savings would occur through quantity procurement;
- the equipment is already stocked in the supply system, and its
provision to the shipbuilder will not require subsequent special
reprovisioning (commonly called "in long supply"); and
- the items are standard stock items of a portable nature which
will constitute the outfit supply.
The selection of which items are to be designated GFE must also consider
the requirement for standardisation, commonality and interoperability
with allied nations.
When a ship is built in a Naval dockyard, all equipment and material
is effectively furnished by the government and must then be procured in
accordance with the purchasing policy of that government. In Australia,
a distinction is then made by designating the equipment as either Naval
Board Supply Items (NBSI) or Shipbuilder Supply Items (SBSI). When a
ship is built in a commercial dockyard, the procurement of contractor
furnished equipment and material is largely carried out in accordance
with the shipbuilder's own procurement policy. In the U.S., the purchas-
ing policy of a contractor is reviewed to determine that it is efficient
and effective in the expenditure of government funds. It has recently
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been demonstrated in Australia that a commercial shipbuilding firm was
able to procure items of CFE in 16 to 44 weeks, with an average of 35
weeks. Similar items procured by the Navy took between 46 to 130 weeks,
averaging 77 weeks, from the placement of the orders to receipt.
[Ref. 31: paragraph 18]
This chapter will discuss the problems associated with particular
GFE and highlight some possible solutions to these problems. The require-
ment for GFE and CFE to have some level of standardisation is also
discussed.
B. PROBLEMS
The shipbuilding programme management office is usually based on
a matrix organisation with the functional areas procuring and controling
the GFE. Whilst this makes possible greater specialisation with less
technical duplication, proper coordination is necessary to ensure ade-
quate cost, schedule and performance control. [Ref. 24: 13]
When the Government undertakes to furnish material to contractors,
it becomes contractually obligated to ensure that the material is deliv-
ered in time, is properly identified, is suitable for its intended use,
and that it conforms to the specifications for the total system.
Additionally, there are significant cost implications in the management
of GFE.
1. Timing
The timing of the delivery of GFM to a contractor is very impor-
tant: late deliveries cause delays and disruptions, early deliveries
affect storage and warranty conditions.
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The shipbuilders' construction schedules and delivery dates can
be disturbed by late supply of equipment or information. The work,
either in planning or actual construction, in a particular area, or a
related area, could be severly disrupted if the right material is not
available. To rearrange the schedule may not be fully possible espec-
ially when the activities involve several disciplines. Inevitably, the
final delivery date must be delayed, and the costs rise.
Early delivery of equipment to the shipbuilder makes it necessary
for him to store the equipment until installation is possible. Conse-
quently, this equipment could be subjected to degradation due to environ-
mental conditions, pilferage or cannibalisation for preceding ships. The
contractor may have to establish some type of preventative maintenance
programme for the equipment, and provide adequate security during the
storage period. The Government may have a warranty of this equipment but
cannot exercise the conditions on the warranty if a receipt testing is
not possible within a certain period, and the warranty could expire prior
to the installation and initial testing. If the shipbuilder does not, or
cannot, accept responsibility for the equipment prior to the due date
because of space or manpower implications, the Government would have to
provide the appropriate facilities.
2. Specifications
The adequacy of the specifications supplied to a shipbuilder
is extremely important. Defective or incomplete specifications have to
be amended prior to all preparations for installing items of equipment.
If the equipment is installed and then a fault is discovered with the
specifications, alterations or deletions to the work are usually required
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with the resultant effect on the delivery schedule and cost. The speci-
fications could originate from the Navy, another contractor, or from the
lead-yard in a major shipbuilding programme.
3. Identification
The proper identification of material impacts on the shipbuilders'
planning and control. The contract documents, drawings, specifications
and equipments must be clearly identified, and the method of identifica-
tion consistent between related documents and equipment.
Confusion inevitably arises when the contract quotes another
document which is subsequently amended, or the identification is altered.
Areas of concern are drawings which are supplied by a third party, but
subsequently endorsed by the Navy with another identification number.
The equipment is then delivered with another series of identification
markings. Cross verification of these different markings impacts on the
delivery schedule and configuration management.
One major problem encountered by Todd Pacific Dockyard Seattle, and
the Superintendent of Shipbuilding Conversion and Repair, Seattle in the
FFG programme, is the identification of GFM at delivery to the ship-
builder. The only formal documentation identifying GFM is the "Schedule
A" listing the GFM to be provided to the contractor for the performance
of the contract. [Ref. 21: 405] This listing, however, identifies major
items only and is inadequate for use as a means of identifying all items
of equipments received. The FFG Program Office (PMS 399) has provided to
SUPSHIPS a further breakdown of Schedule A to part numbers of major
sub-assemblies. This, however, is still inadequate. The packing list
accompanying the equipment is sometimes incomplete so an adequate check
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is not possible using this. The warehouseman at Todd uses the packing
list for the first delivered of each equipment as his baseline. This may
be acceptable for a competent warehouseman in a lengthy programme, but
is insufficient for a one-of-a-kind situation.
C. SOLUTIONS
The management of GFM within the two Navies is similar in that
the matrix organisation concept is followed and there are documents
issued to ensure that the appropriate functional areas are identified and
the appropriate responsibility assigned for the procurement of GFE. The
RAN uses the Equipment Acquisition Strategy (EAS) document incorporated
into the Naval Project Directive (NPD); the USN uses Ship Project
Directives (SPD). The NPD is an executive document which directs author-
ities to take action, whilst the SPD represents an agreement between the
Ship Acquisition Program Manager (SHAPM) and the Participating Manager
(PARM), and is signed by both parties. The type of information contained
in each is similar, the major difference being that NPD encompasses the
total project, whereas the SPD addresses only those goods or services
under the cognizance of a particular PARM. Several SPD's with a number
of PARM's are necessary for each ship construction project.
Considering the relative sizes of the two navies, each type of
document is probably appropriate for the prevailing conditions.
All of the problems discussed in the previous section lead to slip-
pages in the delivery schedule and increased cost. In the USA, ship-
builders have filed substantial claims resulting from GFM-associated
problems against the government. In Australia, these same problems have
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resulted in large cost overruns and late deliveries for ships either
being built or refitted in Navy operated dockyards.
The early selection of GFM and in particular GFE, or the selection of
GFE items that are currently in production would solve many of the late
delivery problems encountered.
A cut-off date for the designation of an item for each ship should be
established such that any equipment changes or modifications made after
that date would not be incorporatd. The configuration of the equipment
would be firm and could be validated to ensure that the correct specifi-
cations were available to the shipbuilder. A disadvantage, however, to
this approach is that a possible technological breakthrough would not be
incorporated resulting in inferior equipment, when a relatively small
delay would have given an enhanced capability for the operational life
of, say, the weapons system.
Firm specifications and configurations would also enable identifica-
tion problems to be solved. A constant effort throughout the programme
would be necessary to ensure that all the project documentation is
compatible and cross referencing thus made easier. The identification of
delivered items could be enhanced with an expanded Schedule A format to
major component level. A possible tool for this is the RAN's Equipment
Breakdown and Support Assessment List (EBASAL). The EBASAL is designed
to facilitate the ordering of support spares and special -to-type tools
and test equipment. It is completed by the contractor and identifies the
parent equipment, each main assembly, each significant subassembly, and
any special -to-type tools and test equipment. The component items
relevant to each main assembly are also listed. If this document was
74

made available to the shipbuilder, he would have a comprehensive listing
of deliverable GFE items.
For the Guided Missile Frigate (FFG-7) shipbuilding programme, the
USN has made extensive use of a Land Base Test Site for combat systems
equipment. Such equipment (radars, sonars, launchers, guns and fire
control systems), are generally always GFE. The original purpose of the
Land Based Test Site was to install and integrate live equipments in
simulated shipboard compartments and to develop the computer programs to
render the entire system operable early in the ship design process.
[Ref. 24] It has also acted as a staging and testing ground for GFE
prior to shipping these equipments to the shipyards. Each equipment is
inspected and tested individually, and then as a total system. Hence the
Government could exercise the warranty provisions in sufficient time, and
hold the equipments until the required shipment date. At this time, a
procedure could be developed to relieve the identification problems at
the shipyard.
With the size of Australia's shipbuilding programme, the luxury of a
Land Based Test Site is not affordable. For the RAN FFG's built in the
USA, the facility can be used; however, for ships built in Australia,
with the possibility of equipments from several different countries, its
use is denied. An alternative would be for the equipment to be set up
ashore in the dockyard prior to installation. The limitations of this
approach, however, are that the total system could not be integrated, and
an operational check-out impossible. It may, however, be a step in the
right direction, given sufficient numbers of each equipment in service.
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D. STANDARDISATION, COMMONALITY AND INTEROPERABILITY
In selecting equipment to be fitted in a ship, cognizance of the
of the requirements for standardisation, commonality and interoperability
with allied nations is necessary. The USA is currently engaged in
several studies and projects related to NATO Rationalisation, Standardi-
sation and Interoperability (RSI). These are broad terms and thus
require defining prior to discussion on their applicability to the RAN
requirements:
1. Rational isation
"Any action that increases the effectiveness of Allied
Forces through more efficient or effective use of defense
resources committed to the Alliance needs, standardisation,
specialization, mutual support, improved interoperability
or greater cooperation." [Ref. 27]
This is a broad definition forming the basis of policies towards stan-
dardisation. It says, in effect, that each Allied nation in enhancing
their own military effectiveness should consider the needs of the other
nations.
2. Standardisation
"The process by which member nations achieve the closest
practicable cooperation among forces; the most efficient
use of research, development and production resources;
and agree to adopt on the broadest possible basis the use
of (a) common or compatible operational, administrative,
and logistic procedures; (b) common or compatible technical
procedures and criteria; (c) common compatible or inter-
changeable supplies, compontents, weapons, or equipment;
and (d) common or compatible tactical doctrine with
corresponding organizational compatibility." [Ref. 27]
This definition is again very broad, and does not specify the degree





"The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide
services to and accept services from other systems,
units or forces and to use the services so exchanged
to enable them to operate effectively together." [Ref. 27]
Interoperability is an attempt for different systems, although not
necessarily "standardised," to work together.
4. Commonality
"A quality which applies to material or systems
possessing like and interchangeable characteristics
enabling each to be utilized or operated and maintained
by personnel trained on the others without additional
specialized training; and/or having interchangeable
repair parts and/or components; and applying to
consummable items interchangeably equivalent without
adjustment." [Ref. 27]
There are two sides to this definition: one being that equipments
should have no significant external differences, and the other that
internal composition should be as identical as possible.
From the above definitions, it can be seen that effectively "common-
ality" is a subset of "interoperability" which in turn is a subset
of "standardisation." To meet a given operational requirement, it is
certainly beneficial to have a standard system, design, logistics and
operating procedures; logistic items (spare parts, modules, etc.) that
can be utilized in many systems become common items.
Standardisation has many benefits, the major ones being: the
reduction in life cycle costs, the reduction in spare parts to be pur-
chased and stocked, the simplification of test equipment requirements and
testing procedures, the reduction in training requirements, and the
improvement of reliability, maintainability and availability. However,
on the other hand, there are disadvantages of standardisation, some
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being: ideals cannot be realised, limitation of design flexibility,
more parameters become fixed, expensive subassemblies become more pop-
ulous and voluminous, and greater susceptibility to obsolescence. [Ref.
20: Chapter 14]
The advantages and disadvantages clearly have to be weighed against
each other to determine the level of standardisation required: intra-
ship, intra-class, intra-Navy, inter-service, or inter-nation. The
decision on the degree of standardisation and methods to achieve the
required level of standardisation should be made early in, and continually
reviewed during, the acquisition cycle.
As Australia buys most major weapons systems from other countries, in
particular the USA, a large degree of interoperability occurs naturally.
However, the RAN is a small navy, with three or four major classes of
destroyers and frigate-size ships, and there is little commonality
between classes, and, in some cases, within a particular class. An
improvement in the degree of standardisation would be beneficial.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter has described the problems associated with government
furnished equipment supplied to a shipbuilder. The problems occur in the
areas of timing, specifications, and identification, which all lead to
slippages in the delivery schedule and increased cost of the shipbuilding
programme.
Early selection of GFE would solve most of the problems with the
attendent risk that the latest available technology may not be incor-




The requirements for standardisation, commonality and interoperabil-
ity with allied nations has been discussed and some advantages and dis-
advantages highlighted. No firm guidelines have been proposed as it is
considered that the requirements for each project must be considered
individually. However, for a small navy, standardisation between
the ships would reduce costs in training, spares support and would
simplify the management aspects of equipment. It would mean, however,
that advances in technology would not be incorporated rapidly with the
consequent feeling of being "out-of-date."
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V. A PROPOSAL FOR THE RAN
A. INTRODUCTION
Existing requirements and procedures for ship construction projects
in the Royal Australian Navy are not particularly well defined, and a
need is seen to improve the situation from the determination of the
requirements through to the operational use and subsequent retirement of
a ship. This chapter will develop a proposal for the complete life
cycle; however, some of the ideas could yery well be used for a partic-
ular phase, without having the whole proposal accepted.
B. THE PROPOSAL
The Royal Australian Navy normally operates with approximately
twelve front line operational warships of the destroyer/frigate size. If
the average life of such a warship is 24 to 30 years, Australia should on
the average be procuring warships at the rate of one every two to two-and-
a-half years. It is suggested that Australia embark upon a programme
which will produce ships at this rate.
By embarking on a cyclical replacement programme for warships, the
"replacement syndrome" in lieu of mission needs is not being promoted.
Australia, being a large island nation dependent on trade, will always
need some form of defence at sea. The basic platform requirements, such
as displacement, range and speed, do not alter significantly over time
frames up to 30 years, allowing a common platform to be designed with
little need for modification for 10 to 20 years, or say up to ten ships.
The effectiveness of a weapons system from its initial operational
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commitment varies more in relation to perceived threats than does the
platform requirements; however, a commonly accepted period is 10 to 15
years, allowing five ships to be built with a common weapons system, and
a further five existing ships to be updated with the same weapons system.
Modifications to such a weapons system inevitably are introduced, which
extend the effective period further.
The basic proposal is, therefore, to develop an on-going replacement
programme to maintain the present size of the Royal Australian Navy, such
that a ship is completed every two years, the requirements being contin-
ually reviewed, however, the platforms not substantially altered for ten
new ships, and the weapons fit not being altered for five new ships. A
diagrammatic presentation of this proposal is shown in Figure 11.
The effects on Government considerations, Defence asquisition organi-
sations, industrial activities, equipment considerations and other aspects
of this proposal are discussed in the following sections.
C. EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSAL
1. Government
This proposal is for a replacement programme only and is not a
means of increasing the size of the Royal Australian Navy. As Australia's
political structure is such that the govenment-of-the-day directs the
activities of the Defence Forces, and the political climate such that a
change of government could occur every three years, a bi-partisan agree-
ment between the major political parties would be required for such a
programme to continue. As a replacement programme alone, the idea may be













































































































































size of the Navy to meet changes in the strategic conditions, the respon-
sibility of the government-of-the-day after due analysis of the threat.
2. Defence Acquisition Organisation
The present acquisition procedures within the Navy, Defence
and other government organisations are cumbersome and inefficient. An
established on-going programme would enable the appropriate organisations
to consolidate their procedures. In particular for the Navy, a consol-
idated procurement organization, such as that proposed by the Bruce
Working Party, would be yery effective and efficient. The consolidated
organisation would receive the technical specifications of the require-
ment and would then process the requirement through the tendering,
assessment of tenders, contract preparation and award, contract adminis-
tration and finally receiving the equipment/ship for handover to the
user. [Ref. 31] The approval procedures leading to the various
milestones would be reduced. Accountability and responsibility would be
easily visible, and administrative costs would be reduced.
This type of organisation could be further consolidated if the
technical aspects are also included. This approach was suggested by the
Naval Procurement Working Party (NAVPRO). [Ref. 25: 7] The conse-
quences of this change would be a departure from the matrix-type organi-
sation to a functionally-oriented structure. However, as the ship design
and selection of equipment requirements would be greatly reduced, no
increase in manpower is seen as necessary.
3. Industrial Activities
It is unlikely that an overseas shipbuilder would be willing
to provide ships to such a programme, and thus this programme would
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require the ships to be built in Australia. The Australian shipbuilding
industry would therefore have an on-going approved programme and would
thus be able to plan their activities in relation to plant, equipment,
manpower and management controls more effectively. The effect on the
competition is difficult to determine as there is the possibility of
collaboration between shipyards leading to a conglomerate and monopolis-
tic situation, and also the possibility of other corporations seeing the
requirements and endeavoring to enter the shipbuilding industry. By
maintaining a Naval Dockyard for refitting ships, but with a capability
of ship construction, competition should be enhanced.
Other industries, such as the electronics industry, in Australia
would be motivated to enter into defence contracts if an on-going need is
foreseen. The production runs would be for similar quantities of each
equipment, but they would be spread over a longer period. It would not
be economical to produce ten weapons systems over ten years. The possi-
bility of overseas sales of such modular equipment should not be over-
looked, allowing more units to be produced with consequent reductions in
R&D and set-up costs per unit.
The stabilising effect in local industries would be felt from the
design stages, through the production, to the maintenance and follow on
support stages. It would affect capital equipment purchases, learning
curves of designers and producers, and encourage more people of all
disciplines to enter the industries.
4. Equipment Considerations
All equipment and material required for the construction of a
ship would be procured more efficiently through quantity purchases,
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reductions in specifications and ordering preparations, and general
reductions in administrative and other delays. The selection of equip-
ment would require a greater effort in the initial stages of such a
programme, but the effort to maintain the programme will be reduced.
For the weapons systems which will be incorporated into the
platform, a greater degree of modularity than exists today would be
required. However, it is considered that apart from launchers, guns and
magazines, most present day electronic equipment could be more modularized
Ideally, each piece of electronic equipment should be portable to allow
installation inside a ship to be accomplished by carrying the item
through standard doorways and hatchways and then plugging into a pre-
determined equipment rack. The services provided by the platform, such
as electrical power, air conditioning, cooling water, and control wiring,
would require sufficient contingencies built in to accommodate changes to
equipment throughout the operational life of the platform. If follow on
equipments, although enhanced technologically and in their capabilities,
were produced in similar sizes and numbers of modules, the half-life
modification of a ship would be considerably easier, and would not require
major superstructure changes as experienced with the Destroyer Escorts
and Daring Class Destroyers.
The construction or refitting of a ship would effectively be
divided into two distinct stages: the platform and the weapons fit.
These two activities need not necessarily be assigned to the same contrac-
tor; for example, the platform could be constructed or refitted in a
commercial shipyard, with the weapons fit being installed by a Naval
dockyard. Delays in the availability of one weapons system would not
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prevent a new ship from being completed, from undergoing trials, or even
from operating, albeit with a reduced capacity. It is considered




As Australia does not have the technology base to develop a
complete modern weapons system, it will still be necessary to obtain from
overseas the equipment, or, at the least, the production information. To
purchase equipments overseas to the required level of modularity may not
be possible when the overseas manufacturer is producing the same equipment
for several countries, and the Australian order is small in comparison to
the total quantity being produced. If the other customer countries are
also interested in the modularity concept, the manufacturer would
undoubtedly be interested in such specifications. If not, then the
design specifications could be bought by an Australian company or licensed
production could be considered. The overseas manufacturer could still
provide the major components, the Australian manufacturer configuring
them to meet the modularisation needs.
As a greater number of the same weapons systems would eventually
be procured, standardisation within the Navy would occur. The advantages
of such commonality described previously would result. Additionally, if
one, or even two, extra systems were procured than those required for
shipboard use, a site ashore could be established with the appropriate
services to give a "hot," but not necessarily fully operational, system.
This system could be used for technical or operational training, fault
diagnosis on equipments removed from ships during maintenance periods,
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or as a ready-use spare to meet an urgent operational requirement. This
shore-based equipment would not be as effective as the Land Based Test
Site used in America, but it would certainly be a step towards the
concept. The cost of these extra systems would be partly offset by
reduced training costs, and reduced spares inventory costs.
The morale of everyone involved with Naval ships would increase.
The seagoing uniformed personnel would see a continual update of the Navy
as a whole; they would be better trained, less frustrated due to lack of
spares and long maintenance periods, and would be more interchangeable
between both ships and shore facilities. Those employed ashore in policy
and procurement activities would see a result of their efforts, without
fear of a project being disbanded after many years of work. Dockyard and
industry personnel would have an on-going programme resulting in employ-
ment tenure.
D. SUMMARY
If an on-going proposal to replace the ships of the Royal Australian
Navy was introduced, such that a new ship appeared every two years, with
a common platform for ten ships, and a common weapon fit for five new and
five existing platforms, many advantages would occur. The advantages
would affect the procurement activities within the Navy and Defence
organisations, the Australian industrial base for the production and
support of defence equipment, the maintenance, operational and training
requirements for the Navy, and all personnel involved with ships.
The proposal would not be easy to initiate: the cooperation of the
political parties and industry would be required; the initial platform
design would require considerable effort; and the redesign of weapons
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systems to the modular concept and their subsequent manufacture would
require considerable effort. However, once underway, the programme would
be relatively simple to plan, control, coordinate and implement. It
would also establish a baseline from which advanced or additional require-
ments could be generated.
Although the ideas expressed result from this proposal in total,
they could be individually applied to existing arrangements for various
aspects of ship construction projects.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY OF THESIS
This thesis has presented the author's view of various aspects of
the acquisition processes of the Royal Australian Navy and the United
States Navy. The processes have been compared, and, recognising that
direct comparisons between two countries of widely differing populations,
government structure, defence organisations and industrial capabilities
are difficult, some areas of possible improvements have been discussed.
A proposal for the RAN to embark on a replacement shipbuilding
programme has been presented. This proposal is for the RAN to have built
in Australia one warship of destroyer/frigate size every two years. The
warship platform design would remain essentially stable for ten ships,
with a modularized weapon fit suitable for half the life of the platforms,
installed in five new, and five existing ships. The impacts and require-
ments of various aspects of such an acquisition programme have been
discussed, and presented in such a way that they could be adopted indi-
vidually even if the total proposal was considered unsuitable after a
more detailed study.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The actual procedures for the acquisition of equipments followed by
the defence departments in both Australia and the United States of
America are, in general, straightforward and follow logical steps from
one stage to another, with sufficient feedback loops to provide necessary
checks and balances. The majority of material written about the process
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in the USA tends to criticise the procedures. However, it is considered
that the procedures are adequate; the problems occur in the management of
these procedures.
The early selection of items which are to be furnished to the ship-
builder by the government would reduce the problems leading to delays and
increased costs of the shipbuilding programme. Selecting items that are
standardised with other equipments would reduce costs in training,
support and management. The opposing view is that advances in technology
would not be incorporated, leading to earlier obsolescence of equipments.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The major recommendation resulting from this research is for Australia
to embark on a cyclical replacement programme for destroyer/frigate size
ships. This proposal is discussed fully in Chapter V.
The procedures for major system acquisition are adequate, however, it
is recommended that improvements could be made in the management of the
process within each Navy. A unified procurement area within the RAN along
the lines proposed by the Bruce and Naval Procurement Working Parties is
recommended. The final structure of this area requires further study,
but should be considered in the light of the other services and the
Defence Department as a whole.
The requirements for government furnished equipment should be deter-
mined and finalised as early as practicable to reduce costs and maintain
delivery dates. A balance between technology and cost and delivery must
be drawn for each project alone; a firm general policy statement is
inappropriate. Similar arguments exist for the extent of standardisation
to be adopted. It is, however, recommended that for the RAN it is more
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important to have ships at sea with adequate equipments fitted, than to
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